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Abstract
We study hedonic games with dichotomous preferences. Hedonic games
are cooperative games in which players desire to form coalitions, but only
care about the makeup of the coalitions of which they are members; they
are indifferent about the makeup of other coalitions. The assumption of
dichotomous preferences means that, additionally, each player’s preference
relation partitions the set of coalitions of which that player is a member
into just two equivalence classes: satisfactory and unsatisfactory. A player
is indifferent between satisfactory coalitions, and is indifferent between un-
satisfactory coalitions, but strictly prefers any satisfactory coalition over
any unsatisfactory coalition. We develop a succinct representation for
such games, in which each player’s preference relation is represented by a
propositional formula. We show how solution concepts for hedonic games
with dichotomous preferences are characterised by propositional formulas.
1 Introduction
Hedonic games are cooperative games in which players desire to form coalitions,
but only care about the makeup of the coalitions of which they are members;
they are indifferent about the makeup of other coalitions (Drèze and Greenberg,
1980; Chalkiadakis et al., 2011). Because the specification of a hedonic game
requires the expression of each player’s ranking over all sets of players including
him, in general, such a specification requires exponential space – and, when
used by a centralised mechanism, exponential elicitation time. Such an ex-
ponential blow-up severely limits the practical applicability of hedonic games,
and for this reason researchers have investigated compactly represented hedonic
games. One approach to this problem has been to consider possible restric-
tions on the possible preferences that players have. For example, one may
∗This paper was presented at the Eleventh Conference on Logic and the Foundations of
Game and Decision Theory (LOFT 2014) in Bergen, Norway, July 27-30, 2014.
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assume that each player specifies only a ranking over single players, and that
her preferences over coalitions are defined according to the identity of the best
(respectively, worst) element of the coalition (Cechlárová and Hajduková, 2004;
Cechlárová, 2008). One may also assume that each player’s preferences depend
only on the number of players in her coalition (Bogomolnaia and Jackson, 2002).
These representations come with a domain restriction, i.e., a loss of expressiv-
ity: Elkind and Wooldridge (2009) consider a fully expressive representation for
hedonic games, based on weighted logical formulas. In the worst case, the rep-
resentation of Elkind and Wooldridge requires space exponential in the number
of players, but in many cases the space requirement is much smaller.
In this paper, we consider another natural restriction on player preferences.
We consider hedonic games with dichotomous preferences. The assumption of
dichotomous preferences means that each player’s preference relation partitions
the set of coalitions of which that player is a member into just two equivalence
classes: satisfactory and unsatisfactory. A player is indifferent between satisfac-
tory coalitions, and is indifferent between unsatisfactory coalitions, but strictly
prefers any satisfactory coalition over any unsatisfactory coalition.
While to the best of our knowledge dichotomous preferences have not
been previously studied in the context of hedonic games, they have of course
been studied in other economic settings, such as by Bogomolnaia et al. (2005),
Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2004), and Bouveret and Lang (2008) in the con-
text of fair division, by Harrenstein et al. (2001) in the context of Boolean
games, by Konieczny and Pino-Pérez (2002) in the context of belief merg-
ing, by Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2004) in the context of matching, and by
Brams and Fishburn (2007) (and many others) in the context of approval vot-
ing.
When the space of all possible alternatives has a combinatorial structure,
propositional formulas are a very natural representation of dichotomous prefer-
ences. In such a representation, variables correspond to goods (in fair division),
outcome variables (Boolean games), state variables (belief merging), or players
(coalition formation). In the latter case, which we will be concerned with in
the present paper, each player i can express her preferences over coalitions con-
taining her by using propositional atoms of the form ij (j 6= i), meaning that j
is in the same coalition as i. Thus, for example, player 1 can express by the
formula (12∨ 13)∧¬14 that he wants to be in a coalition with player 2 or with
player 3, but not with player 4. Our primary aim in this paper is to present such
a propositional framework for specifying hedonic games and computing various
solution concepts. We will first define a propositional logic using atoms of the
form ij, together with domain axioms expressing that the output of the game
should be a partition of the set of players. Then we consider a range of solu-
tion concepts, and show that they can be characterised by some specific classes
of (sometimes polysize) formulas, and solved using propositional satisfiability
solvers. The result is a simple, natural, and compact representation scheme for
expressing preferences, and a machinery based on satisfiability for computing
partitions satisfying some specific stability criteria such as Nash stability or core
stability.
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2 Preliminaries
In this section, we recall some definitions relating to coalitions, coalition struc-
tures (or partitions), and hedonic games. See, e.g., Chalkiadakis et al. (2011)
for an in-depth discussion of these and related concepts.
Coalitions and Partitions We consider a setting in which there is a set N
of n players with typical elements i, j, k, . . . . Players can form coalitions, which
we will denote by S, T, . . . . A coalition is simply a subset of the players N . One
may usefully think of the players as getting together to form teams that will
work together. A coalition structure is an exhaustive partition π = {S1, . . . , Sm}
of the players into disjoint coalitions, i.e., S1 ∪ · · · ∪ Sm = N and Si ∩ Sj = ∅
for all Si, Sj ∈ π such that i 6= j. For technical convenience, we slightly deviate
from standard conventions and require that every coalition structure π contains
the empty set ∅. We commonly refer to coalition structures simply as partitions.
In examples, we also write, e.g., [12 |34 | 5 ] rather than the more cumbersome
{{1, 2}, {3, 4}, {5}, ∅}. For each player i in N , we let Ni = {S ⊆ N : i ∈ S}
denote the set of coalitions over N that contain i. If π = {S1, . . . , Sm} is a
partition, then π(i) refers to the coalition in π that player i is a member of.
The notion of players leaving their own coalition and joining another lies
at the basis of many of the solution concepts that we will come to consider.
We introduce some notation to represent such situations. For T a group of
players (not necessarily a coalition in π), by π|T we refer to the partition {S1 ∩
T, . . . , Sm ∩ T } and we write π|−T for π|N\T . Moreover, for S a coalition in
partition π|−T , we use π[T → S] to refer to the partition that results if the
players in T leave their respective coalitions in π and join coalition S. We
also allow T to form a coalition of its own, in which case we write π[T → ∅].
Formally, we have, for S ∈ π|−T ,
π[T → S] = {Sj ∈ π|−T : Sj 6= S} ∪ {S ∪ T, ∅}.
If T is a singleton {i} we also write π|−i and π[i → S] instead of π|−{i} and
π[{i} → S], respectively. Thus, e.g., S∪{i} ∈ π[i→ S] and π[i→ π(i)\{i}] = π.
Finally, define π[i⇄ j] as the partition where i and j exchange their places,
i.e.:
π[i⇄ j] = (π \ {π(i), π(j)}) ∪ {(π(i) \ {i}) ∪ {j}, (π(j) \ {j}) ∪ {i}}.
Thus, for partition π = [123|45], we have π(1) = π(2) = {1, 2, 3} and π(4) =
{4, 5}. Furthermore, π|{1,2,4,5} = [12|45] and π|−{3,4} = [12|5]. Also, π[1 →
{4, 5}] = [23|145], π[1→ ∅] = [1|23|45], and π[3⇄ 4] = [124|35].
Hedonic games Hedonic games are the class of coalition formation games in
which each player is only interested in the coalition he is a member of, and is
indifferent as to how the players outside his own coalition are grouped. Hedonic
games were originally introduced by Drèze and Greenberg (1980) and further
developed by, e.g., Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002). Also see Hajduková (2006)
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for a survey from a more computational point of view. Formally, a hedonic
game is a tuple (N,R1, . . . , Rn), where Ri represents i’s transitive, reflexive,
and complete preferences over the set of all coalitions Ni containing i. Thus,
S Ri T intuitively signifies that player i considers coalition S at least as desirable
as coalition T , where S and T are coalitions in Ni. By Pi and Ii we denote
the strict and the indifferent part of Ri, respectively. The preferences Ri of a
player i are said to be dichotomous whenever Ni can be partitioned into two
disjoint sets N +i and N
−
i such that i strictly prefers all coalitions in N
+
i to
those in N −i and is indifferent otherwise, i.e., S Pi T if and only if S ∈ N
+
i
and T ∈ N −i . A coalition S in Ni is acceptable to i if i (weakly) prefers S
to coalition {i}, where he is on his own, i.e., if S Ri {i}. By contrast, we say
that a coalition S is satisfactory or desirable for i if S ∈ N +i . Satisfactory
partitions are thus generally acceptable to all players. The implication in the
other direction, however, does not hold.
We lift preferences on coalitions to preferences on partitions in a natural
way: player i prefers partition π to partition π′ whenever i prefers coalition π(i)
to coalition π′(i). We also extend the concepts of acceptability and desirability
of coalitions to partitions.
Example 1 Consider the following Boolean game with four players, 1, 2, 3, and
4, whose (dichotomous) preferences are as follows. (Indifferences are indicated
by commas.)
1: {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4} P1 {1}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 4}
2: {2, 1, 3}, {2, 1, 4}, {2, 3, 4} P2 {2}, {2, 1}, {2, 3}, {2, 4}, {2, 1, 3, 4}
3: {3, 1}, {3, 2}, {3, 1, 2} P3 {3}, {3, 4}, {3, 1, 4}, {3, 2, 4}, {3, 1, 2, 4}
4: {4, 1}, {4, 2}, {4, 3}, {4, 1, 2}, {4, 1, 3}, {4} P4 {4, 2, 3}, {4, 1, 2, 3}
Thus, player 1 wants to be in a coalition of at least three and player 2 wishes
to be in a coalition of exactly three. Moreover, player 3 wants to be in the same
coalition as player 1 or as 2. He does not want to be in a coalition with player 4.
Finally, player 4 does not want to be with players 2 and 3 together. There is
exactly one partition that is satisfactory for all four players, namely [123 |4].
For players 1, 2, and 3, all coalitions are acceptable. For player 4, however,
{4, 2, 3} and {1, 2, 3, 4} are unacceptable.
Solution Concepts for Hedonic Games A solution concept associates with
every hedonic game (N,R1, . . . , Rn) a (possibly empty) set of partitions of N .
Here we review some of the most common solution concepts for hedonic games.
Individual rationality captures the idea that every player prefers the coalition
he is in to being on his own, i.e., that coalitions are acceptable to its members.
Thus, formally, π is individually rational if, for all players i in N ,
π(i) Ri {i}.
This condition is obviously equivalent to π Ri π[i→ ∅].
For dichotomous hedonic games, a partition π is said to be social welfare optimal
if it maximises the number of players who are in a satisfactory coalition, that is,
if π maximises |{i ∈ N : π(i) ∈ N +i }|. In a similar way, a partition π is Pareto
optimal if it maximises the set of players being in a satisfactory coalition with
respect to set-inclusion, that is, if there is no partition π′ with
{i ∈ N : π(i) ∈ N +i } ( {i ∈ N : π
′(i) ∈ N +i }.
In the extreme case in which every player is in a most preferred coalition, π is
said to be perfect (cf., Aziz et al., 2013). A perfect partition satisfies any other
of our stability concepts.
A partition is Nash stable if no player would like to unilaterally abandon the
coalition he is in and join any other existing coalition or stay on his own, that
is, if, for all i ∈ N and all S ∈ π,
π(i) Ri S ∪ {i}.
Observe that this condition is equivalent to π Ri π[i→ S].
Core stability concepts consider group deviations instead of individual ones. A
group of players, possibly from different coalitions, is said to block a partition
if they would all benefit by joining together in a separate coalition. Formally, T
blocks (or is blocking) partition π if, for all i ∈ T ,
T Pi π(i).
Thus, T blocks π if and only if π[T → ∅] Pi π for all i ∈ T . A group T weakly
blocks (or is weakly blocking) π if T Ri π(i) holds for all i ∈ T and T Pi π(i)
holds for some i ∈ T . Then, π is core stable if no group is blocking it and π is
strict core stable if no group is weakly blocking it.
Partition π is envy-free if no player is envious of another player, that is, if
no player i would prefer to change places with another player j. Formally,
partition π is envy-free if, for all players i and j,
π Ri π[i⇆ j].
If π[i⇆ j] Pi π we also say that player i envies player j.
Example 1 (continued) In our example, in partition [1, 2, 3 |4] each player
is in a most preferred coalition. As such [1, 2, 3 |4] is perfect as well as social
welfare optimal and satisfies all solution concepts mentioned above. Moreover,
all partitions except [1 |2, 3, 4] and [1, 2, 3, 4] individually rational.
Now, consider partition π = [1 |2, 3 |4]. Here, player 2 does not want to
abandon her coalition {2, 3} and join another as she prefers none of the following
partitions to π: π[2 → {1}] = [1, 2 |3 |4], π[2 → {2, 3}] = [1 |2, 3 |4], π[2 →
{4}], and π[2 → ∅] = [1 |2 |3 |4]. As, however, π[1 → {2, 3}] = [1, 2, 3 |4] and
[1, 2, 3 |4] P1 π, partition π is not Nash stable.
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Also observe that for π = [1 |2, 3 |4] the group {1, 2, 3} is strongly blocking,
as π[{1, 2, 4} → ∅] = [1, 2, 4 |3] and [1, 2, 4 |3] Pi π for all i ∈ {1, 2, 4}. Thus, π
is not core stable. By contrast, [1, 4 |2, 3] is core stable as only player 1 and 2 are
not satisfied and both of them will only be if they can form a blocking coalition of
exactly three. However, {1, 2, 4} is still weakly blocking, and as such [1, 4 |2, 3]
is not strict core stable.
For envy-freeness, consider partition π′ = [1 |2, 4 |3]. Then, player 3 envies
player 4, as π′[3 ⇆ 4] = [1 |2, 3 |4] and [1 |2, 3 |4] P3 π′. By contrast, player 3
does not envy player 2: we have π′[3⇆ 2] = [1 |2 |3, 4] but not [1 |2 |3, 4] P3 π′.
3 A Logic for Coalition Structures
In this section, we develop a logic for representing coalition structures. We
will then use this logic as a compact specification language for dichotomous
preference relations in hedonic games.
Syntax Given a set N of n players, we define a propositional language LN
built from the usual connectives and with for every (unordered) pair {i, j} of
distinct players a propositional variable p{i,j}. The set of propositional variables
we denote by V . Observe that |V | =
(
n
2
)
. For notational convenience we will
write ij for p{i,j}. Thus, ij and ji refer to the same symbol. The language is
interpreted on coalition structures on N and the informal meaning of ij is “i
and j are in the same coalition”. Formally, the formulas of the language LN ,
with typical element ϕ is given by the following grammar
ϕ ::= ij | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∨ ϕ)
where i, j ∈ N and i 6= j. By |ϕ| we denote the size of ϕ.
For a given coalition S of players, we write VS for the propositional variables
in which some i ∈ S appears, i.e.,
VS = {ij ∈ V : i ∈ S or j ∈ S}.
Note that for distinct players i and j we have Vi ∩ Vj = {ij}. The proposi-
tional language over VS we denote by LS . We write Vi and Li for V{i} and
L{i}, respectively. The remaining classical connectives ⊥, ⊤, ∧, →, and ↔ are
defined in the usual way. Moreover, for formulas ψ1, . . . , ψk of formulas, we
have
∧
1≤m≤k ψm and
∨
1≤m≤k ψm abbreviate ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψk and ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ψk,
respectively. We also make use of the following useful notational shorthand:
i1 · · · imim+1 · · · ip =
∧
1≤j≤m
i1ij ∧
∧
m<k≤p
¬i1ik.
Thus, i1 · · · imim+1 · · · ip conveys that i1, . . . , im are in the same coalition and
each of them in another coalition than im+1 · · · ip. Thus, where N = {1, 2, 3, 4},
1234∨1324∨1423 abbreviates (12∧¬13∧¬14)∨(13∧¬12∧¬14)∨(14∧¬12∧¬13)
and signifies that player 1 is in a coalition of two players.
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Semantics We interpret the formulas of LN on partitions π as follows.
π |= ij if and only if π(i) = π(j)
π |= ¬ϕ if and only if π 6|= ϕ
π |= ϕ→ ψ if and only if π 6|= ϕ or π |= ψ
For Ψ ⊆ LN , we have Ψ |= ϕ if π |= ψ for all ψ ∈ Ψ implies π |= ϕ. If Ψ = ∅,
we write |= ϕ and say that ϕ is valid.
Notice that partitions play a dual role in our framework: both their initial
role as coalition structures, and the role of models in our logic. This dual role is
key to using formulas of our propositional language as a specification language
for preference relations. Thus, e.g., partition [1|2|345] satisfies the following
formulas of LN : 345, 31, 34512, ¬12 ∧ (23 ∨ 34), and 12↔ 23.
Axiomatisation We have the following axiom schemes for mutually distinct
players i, j, and k,
(A0) all propositional tautologies
(A1) ij ∧ jk → ik (transitivity)
as well as modus ponens as the only rule of the system:
(MP) from ϕ and ϕ→ ψ infer ψ. (modus ponens)
The resulting logic we refer to as P and write Ψ ⊢P ϕ if there is a derivation
of ϕ from Ψ, (A0), and (A1), using modus ponens.
Theorem 1 (Completeness) Let Ψ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ LN . Then,
Ψ ⊢P ϕ if and only if Ψ |= ϕ.
(sketch): Soundness is straightforward. For completeness a standard Linden-
baum construction can be used. To this end, assume Ψ 6⊢P ϕ. Then, Ψ ∪ {¬ϕ}
is consistent and can as such be extended to a maximal consistent theory Ψ∗.
Define a relation ∼Ψ∗ such that for all i, j ∈ N ,
i ∼Ψ∗ j if and only if ij ∈ Ψ
∗.
The axiom schemes (A0) and (A1) ensure that ∼Ψ∗ is a well-defined equivalence
relation. Let [ i ]∼Ψ∗ = {j ∈ N : i ∼Ψ∗ j} be the equivalence class under ∼Ψ∗ to
which player i belongs. Then define the partition πΨ∗ = {[ i ]∼Ψ∗ : i ∈ N}. By a
straightforward structural induction, it can then be shown that for all ψ ∈ LN ,
πΨ∗ |= ψ if and only if ψ ∈ Ψ
∗.
It follows that πΨ∗ |= Ψ and πΨ∗ 6|= ϕ. Hence, Ψ 6|= ϕ. ✷
7
Alternatively, one can reason with coalition structures in standard proposi-
tional logic, by writing the transitivity axiom directly as a propositional logic
formula. Let
trans =
∧
i,j,k∈N
(ij ∧ jk → ik).
Then, for any propositional formulas ϕ and ψ of LN ,
ϕ ⊢P ψ if and only if ϕ ∧ trans ⊢ ψ
that is, checking whether a formula ϕ implies another formula ψ in P is equiv-
alent to saying that ϕ together with the transitivity constraint implies ψ. This
means that reasoning tasks in P can be done with a classical propositional theo-
rem prover. In what follows we say that two formulas ϕ and ψ are P-equivalent
whenever their equivalence can be proven in P, i.e., ⊢P ϕ↔ ψ.
4 Boolean Hedonic Games
The denotation of a formula ϕ of our propositional language is a set of coali-
tion structures, and we can naturally interpret these as being the desirable or
satisfactory coalition structures for a particular player. Thus, instead of writing
a hedonic game with dichotomous preferences as a structure (N,R1, . . . , Rn),
in which we explicitly enumerate preference relations Ri, we can instead write
(N, γ1, . . . , γn), where γi is a formula of our propositional language that acts as
a specification of the preference relation Ri. Intuitively, γi represents player i’s
‘goal’ and player i is satisfied if his goal is achieved and unsatisfied if he is not.
We refer to a structure (N, γ1, . . . , γn) as a Boolean hedonic game. Thus, a
Boolean hedonic game (N, γ1, . . . , γn) represents the (standard) hedonic game
(N,R1, . . . , Rn) with for each i,
π(i) Ri π
′(i) if and only if π |= γi implies π
′ |= γi.
Observe that, defined thus, the preferences of each player in a hedonic Boolean
game are dichotomous.
It should be clear that every dichotomous preference relation Ri can be
specified by a propositional formula γi, and hence our propositional language
forms a fully expressive representation scheme for Boolean hedonic games.1 In
fact, formulas in LN are strictly more expressive in the sense that they can
represent any dichotomous preference relation over partitions rather than just
preference relations over partitions as induced by a preference relation Ri for a
player i over coalitions in Ni. We find, however, that every Boolean hedonic
1Let i be a player with dichotomous preferences Ri and let Xi be the set of coalitions most
preferred by i, i.e., S ∈ Xi if and only if S Ri S
′ for all coalitions S and S′ containing i.
Then, Ri is represented by following formula of Li in disjunctive normal form:
∨
S∈Xi
( ∧
j∈S
ij ∧
∧
k/∈S
¬ik
)
.
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game (N, γ1, . . . , γn) represents a hedonic game with dichotomous preferences
provided that every player’s goal γi is equivalent to a formula in the language Li,
the sublanguage of LN in which only variables in Vi = {ij : j ∈ N \ {i}} occur.
Intuitively, formulas in Li only convey information about the coalitions player i
is in or she is not in.
Proposition 1 If a Boolean hedonic game (N, γ1, . . . , γn) represents a hedo-
nic game with dichotomous preferences, then for every player i there is a for-
mula ϕi ∈ Li that is P-equivalent to γi. Moreover, if for every player i there is
a formula ϕi ∈ Li that is P-equivalent to γi, then (N, γ1, . . . , γn) represents a
hedonic game with dichotomous preferences.
(sketch): For a player i and ϕ a formula in Li, a straightforward inductive
argument shows that
π |= ϕ if and only if π′ |= ϕ for all π′ with π′(i) = π(i).
Then, the result follows as a corollary. ✷
Often, the use of propositional formulas γi gives a ‘concise’ representation
of the preference relation Ri, although of course in the worst case the shortest
formula γi representing Ri may be of size exponential in the number of play-
ers. In what follows, we will write (N, γ1, . . . , γn), understanding that we are
referring to the game (N,R1, . . . , Rn) corresponding to this specification.
Example 1 (continued) The hedonic game with dichotomous preferences in
Example 1 is represented by the Boolean hedonic game (N, γ1, γ2, γ3, γ4) with
N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and the players’ goals given by:
γ1 = (123 ∨ 124 ∨ 134) γ2 = (2134 ∨ 2143∨ 2341)
γ3 = (31 ∨ 32) ∧ ¬34 γ4 = ¬423.
For each player i we then have that π |= γi if and only if π ∈ N
+
i .
5 Substitution and Deviation
We establish a formal link between substitution in formulas of our language
and the possibility of players deviating from their respective coalition in a given
partition and joining other coalitions.
Substitution We first introduce some formal notation and terminology with
respect to substitution of formulas for variables in our logic.
For ij a propositional variable in VN and ϕ and ψ formulas of LN , we denote
by ϕij←ψ the uniform substitution of variable ij by ψ in ϕ. If ~ı = i1j1, . . . , ikjk
is a sequence of k distinct variables in V and ~ψ = ψ1, . . . , ψk a sequence of k
formulas,
ϕ
~ı←~ψ = ϕi1j1,...,ikjk←ψ1,...,ψk
9
denotes the simultaneous substitution of each imjm by ψm (1 ≤ m ≤ k). Thus,
e.g., (ij ∨ ¬jk)ij,jk←jk,ik = jk ∨ ¬ik. A special case, which recurs frequently in
what follows, is if every ψi is a Boolean, i.e., if ψ1, . . . , ψk ∈ {⊤,⊥}. Sequences
~b = b1, . . . , bk where b1, . . . , bk ∈ {⊤,⊥} we will also refer to as Boolean vectors
of length k. Thus, e.g., ⊤,⊥ is a Boolean vector of length 2 and (ij ∧ jk →
ki)ij,ki←⊤,⊥ = ⊤ ∧ jk → ⊥.
Characterising individual deviations Some of the stability concepts for
Boolean hedonic games we consider in this paper, e.g., Nash stability, are based
on which coalitions an individual player i can join given a partition π. Recall
that these coalitions are given by π|−i. Of course, not all groups of agents
are included in π−i. For instance, let partition π be given by [ 12 |34 |5 ]. Then,
player 1 can join coalition {3, 4} but cannot form a coalition with players 4 and 5
by unilaterally deviating from π. We find that the set π|−i can be characterised
in our logic. This furthermore yields a logical characterisation of when a player i
can unilaterally break loose from his coalition, join another one and thereby
guarantee that a given formula ϕ will be satisfied. A particularly interesting
case is if ϕ implies the respective player’s goal. We thus gain expressive power
with respect to whether a player can beneficially deviate from a given partition,
a crucial concept.
Lemma 1 Let π be a partition, i a player, B a group of players in N \ {i}.
Let furthermore ~b = b1, . . . , bn−1 be a Boolean vector of length n − 1 and i~ =
ij1, . . . , ijn−1 an enumeration of Vi such that B = {j : iji~←~b = ⊤}. Then,
(i) B ∈ π|−i iff π |= transi~←~b,
(ii) B ∈ π|−i and π[i→ B] |= ϕ iff π |= (ϕ ∧ trans)i~←~b.
Proof: We prove (i); the proof for (ii) is by structural induction on ϕ and relies
on similar principles as (i). As~b and i~ are fixed throughout the proof, for better
readability, we write ϕ′ for ϕ
i~←~b.
For the “only if”-direction, assume that B ∈ π−i as well as π 6|= trans ′.
Observe that trans ′ =
∧
k,l,m
(
kl′ ∧ lm′ → km′
)
. Accordingly, there are some
(mutually distinct) k, l, and m such that π 6|= kl′ ∧ lm′ → km′. It suffices to
consider the following three cases.
(a) i /∈ {k, l,m}, (b) i = k, (c) i = l.
Case (a) cannot occur as we would have kl′ = kl, lm′ = lm, km′ = km, and
kl ∧ lm→ km is a theorem of the system.
If (b), then π 6|= il′ ∧ lm′ → im′. It follows that π |= il′, π |= lm′, and
π 6|= im′. Observe that in this case lm′ = lm. Hence, π(l) = π(m). Also notice
that il′, im′ ∈ {⊤,⊥} and, thus, im′ = ⊥ and il′ = ⊤. Accordingly, l ∈ B but
m /∈ B. As i 6= m and having assumed B ∈ π|−i, a contradiction follows:
π(m) 6= π(i) = π(l) = π(m).
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If (c), we have π 6|= ik′ ∧ im′ → km′. Thus, π |= ik′, π |= im′, and π 6|= km′.
Observe that km′ = km. Hence, π(k) 6= π(m). Moreover, ik′, im′ ∈ {⊤,⊥},
from which follows that ik′ = ⊤ and im′ = ⊤. Accordingly, both k,m ∈ B.
With B ∈ π|−i, we obtain that π(k) = π(m), a contradiction.
For the “if”-direction, assume B /∈ π|−i and B 6= ∅. Because of the latter,
there is some j ∈ B. Accordingly, ij′ = ⊤. As B /∈ π|−i, and thus in particular
B 6= π(j) \ {i}, there are two possibilities:
(1) there is some k 6= i with k ∈ π(j) and k /∈ B, or
(2) there is some k 6= i with k /∈ π(j) and k ∈ B.
If (1), we have π(j) = π(k) as well as ik′ = ⊥. As jk′ = jk, it holds that
π |= ij′ ∧ jk′ but π 6|= ik′. If (2), however, we have π(j) 6= π(k) and ik′ = ⊤.
As jk′ = jk, it holds that π |= ij′ ∧ ik′ but π 6|= jk′. In either case it follows
that π 6|= trans ′. ✷
The following example illustrates Lemma 1.
Example 2 Consider the partition π = [12 |34 |5]. Then, π|−1 =
{{2}, {34}, {5}, ∅}. Let 1~ = 12, 13, 14, 15 be a fixed enumeration of V1. Also let
~b1 = ⊥,⊤,⊤,⊥ and ~b2 = ⊥,⊤,⊥,⊤ be Boolean vectors (of length 4). Then,
[ 12 |34 |5 ] |= trans12,13,14,15←⊥,⊤,⊤,⊥.
(This may be established, somewhat tediously, by painstakingly checking all 30
conjuncts of the form (kl ∧ lm) → km of trans.) Now, observe that {j :
1j
1~j←~b1
} = {3, 4} and that {3, 4} ∈ π−1. On the other hand, observe that
(13 ∧ 15 → 35)
1~←~b2
= (⊤ ∧ ⊤) → 35. It is easily established, however, that
[12|34|5] does not satisfy (⊤∧⊤)→ 35 and, hence, neither trans
1~←~b2
. Finally,
observe that {j : 1j
1~←~b1
} = {3, 5} and that {3, 5} is not in π|−1.
We now introduce the following abbreviation, where i~ = ij1, . . . , ijn−1 is
assumed to be a fixed enumeration of Vi.
∃ˆi ϕ =
∨
~b∈{⊥,⊤}n−1
(ϕ ∧ trans)
i~←~b
Thus, ∃ˆi can be understood as the operation of forgetting everything about
player i (in the sense of Lin and Reiter (1994)) while taking the transitivity
constraint into account. Intuitively, ∃ˆi ϕ signifies that given partition π player i
can deviate to some coalition such that that ϕ is satisfied.
Proposition 2 Let π be a partition, i a player, and ϕ a formula of LN . Then,
π |= ∃ˆi ϕ iff π[i→ S] |= ϕ for some S ∈ π|−i,
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Proof: First assume π |= ∃ˆi ϕ. Then, π |= (ϕ ∧ trans)
i~←~b for some
~b ∈
{⊥,⊤}n−1. Define S = {j : ij
i~←~b = ⊤}. By Lemma 1(ii), we then obtain
π[i→ S] |= ϕ.
For the opposite direction, assume that π[i → S] |= ϕ for some S ∈ π|−i.
Define ~b = b1, . . . , bn−1 as the Boolean vector of length n−1 such that for every
1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1,
bk =
{
⊤ if j ∈ S ∪ {i}
⊥ otherwise.
Then, clearly, S = {j : ij
i~←~b = ⊤}. By Lemma 1(ii), it follows that π |= ϕi~←~b.
We may conclude that π |= ∃ˆi ϕ. ✷
It is important to note, however, that the number of Boolean vectors of length k
is exponential in k. Accordingly, ∃ˆi ϕ abbreviates a formula whose size is expo-
nential in the size of ϕ.
Characterising group deviations Besides a single player deviating from
its coalition and joining another, multiple players (from possibly different coali-
tions) could also deviate together and form a coalition of their own. This con-
cept lies at the basis of, e.g., the core stability concept. We establish a formal
connection between substitution and group deviations.
Let T = {i1, . . . , it} be a group of players. Observe that |VT | =
(
n
2
)
−
(
n−t
2
)
and let ~ıT be a fixed enumeration of VT . By the T -separating Boolean vector
(given ~ıT ) we define as the unique Boolean vector
~bT of length
(
n
2
)
−
(
n−t
2
)
such
that for all i ∈ T and all j ∈ N ,
ij
~ı
T
←~bT
=
{
⊤ if j ∈ T ,
⊥ otherwise.
Intuitively, ~bT represents the choice of group T to form a coalition of their own.
Whenever T is clear from the context we omit the subscript in ~bT and ~ıT . The
following characterisation now holds.
Lemma 2 Let (N, γ1, . . . , γn) be a Boolean hedonic game, T a group of play-
ers, π a partition, ~ı a fixed enumeration of VT , and ~bT the corresponding T -
separating Boolean vector. Then, for every formula ϕ ∈ LN ,
π |= ϕ
~ı←~bT
if and only if π[T → ∅] |= ϕ.
6 Characterising Solutions
Our task in this section is to show how the various solution concepts we in-
troduced above can be characterised as formulas of our propositional language.
Let f be a function mapping each Boolean hedonic game G for N to a for-
mula f(G) of LN . Given a solution concept θ, we say that f is a characterisa-
tion of θ if for every Boolean hedonic game G on N and every partition π, we
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have that π is a solution according to θ for game G if and only if π |= f(G). If,
furthermore, there exists a polynomial p such that |f(G)| ≤ p(|N |), then f is a
polynomial characterisation of θ.
Once we have a characterisation of θ, we know that there is a one-to-one
correspondence between the partitions of N satisfying θ and the models of f(G).
Therefore, given a Boolean hedonic game G:
• checking whether there exists a partition satisfying θ in G amounts to
checking whether f(G) is satisfiable;
• computing a partition satisfying θ in G amounts to finding a model
of f(G);
• computing all partitions satisfying θ in G amounts to finding all models
of f(G).
Thus, once we have a characterisation of a solution concept, one can use
a SAT solver to find (some or all) or to check the existence of partitions that
satisfy it. This carries over to conjunctions of solution concepts. For instance,
if individual rationality is characterised by fIR and envy-freeness by fEF , the
there is a one-to-one correspondence between the individual rational envy-free
partitions for G and the models of fIR(G) ∧ fEF (G). More generally, these
techniques can be used for finding or checking partitions satisfying θ that also
have certain other properties expressible in LN .
In the remainder of the section we focus on how a number of classical solution
concepts, and see how they can be characterised in our logic.
Individual rationality, perfection, and optimality Recall that a parti-
tion is individually rational if any player is at least as happy in her coalition
as being alone, that is, no player would prefer to leave her coalition to form
a singleton coalition. Now we have the following characterisation of individual
rationality in our logic.
Proposition 3 Let (N, γ1, . . . , γn) be a Boolean hedonic game, let i be a player
with goal γ, and let π be a partition. Let, furthermore, i~ be a fixed enumer-
ation of Vi and let ~b = ⊥, . . . ,⊥ be the Boolean vector of length n − 1 only
containing ⊥. Then,
(i) π is acceptable to i iff π |= (γi)i~←~b → γi,
(ii) π is individually rational iff π |=
∧
i∈N
(
(γi)i~←~b → γi
)
.
Proof: We only give the proof for (i), as (ii) follows as an immediate conse-
quence. For (i), merely consider the following equivalences, of which the third
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one follows from Lemma 1(ii).
π is acceptable to i iff π Ri π[i→ ∅]
iff π[i→ ∅] |= γi implies π |= γi
iff π |= (γi)i~←~b implies π |= γi
iff π |= (γi)i~←~b → γi.
This concludes the proof. ✷
To illustrate Proposition 3 we consider again Example 1.
Example 1 (continued) In the game of our example, all partitions are ac-
ceptable to player 1, whose goal is given by γ1 = 123 ∨ 124 ∨ 134. Let V1 be
enumerated by 1~ = 12, 13, 14 and let ~b = ⊥,⊥,⊥. Then, (γ2)12,13,14←⊥,⊥,⊥
is P-equivalent to ⊥ and, hence, π |= (γ2)12,13,14←⊥,⊥,⊥ → γ1 for all parti-
tions π. According to Proposition 3 this signifies that to player 1 every partition
is acceptable.
Now consider player 4, whose goal is given by ¬423, that is, by ¬(42 ∧
43). Let V4 be enumerated by 41, 42, 43 and let ~b = ⊥,⊥,⊥. Then, ¬(42 ∧
43)41,42,43←⊥,⊥,⊥ = ¬(⊥ ∧ ⊥), which is obviously P-equivalent to ⊤. Hence,
π |= ¬(42 ∧ 43)41,42,43←⊥,⊥,⊥ if and only if π |= ¬(42 ∧ 43),
meaning that a partition π is acceptable to player 4 if and only if π satisfies his
goal.
The logical characterisation of perfect perfect partition is immediate, as
witnessed by the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Let (N, γ1, . . . , γn) be a Boolean hedonic game. Then, a parti-
tion π is perfect if and only if π |=
∧
i∈N
γi.
As a consequence, a perfect partition exists if and only if the formula trans ∧∧
i∈N γi is satisfiable. Moreover, finding a social welfare maximising partition
reduces to finding valuation satisfying a maximum number of formulas γi∧trans ,
that is, to solving a maxsat problem.
Leveraging the same idea of iteratively checking whether a perfect partition
can be found for a subset of agents, one can compute Pareto optimal solutions
for a given game. A subset Ψ of formulas is said to be a maximal trans-consistent
if both
(i) Ψ ∪ {trans} is consistent, and
(ii) Ψ′ ∪ {trans} is inconsistent for all sets of formulas Ψ′ with Ψ ( Ψ′.
We now have the following proposition.
Proposition 5 A partition π of a Boolean hedonic game is Pareto optimal if
and only if {γi : π |= γi} is a maximal trans-consistent subset of {γ1, . . . , γn}
Algorithms for computing maximal consistent subsets are well-known and could
thus be exploited for the computation of Pareto optimal partitions.
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Nash stability Recall that a partition π is Nash stable, if no player i wishes
to leave his coalition π(i) and join another (possibly empty) coalition so as to
satisfy his goal. Leveraging our results from Section 5, we obtain the following
characterisation of this fundamental solution concept.
Proposition 6 Let (N, γ1, . . . , γn) be a Boolean hedonic game and π a parti-
tion. Then,
π is Nash stable if and only if π |=
∧
i∈N
(
(∃ˆi γi)→ γi
)
.
Proof: Consider an arbitrary player i and observe that following equivalences
hold. The fourth equivalence holds in virtue of Proposition 2. The third one is
a standard law of logic: merely observe that π |= γi is not dependent on S.
π is Nash stable
iff for all i ∈ N and S ∈ π|−i: π Ri π[i→ S]
iff for all i ∈ N and S ∈ π|−i: if π[i→ S] |= γi then π |= γi
iff for all i ∈ N : if π[i→ S] |= γi for some S ∈ π|−i then π |= γi
iff for all i ∈ N : if π |= ∃ˆi γi then π |= γi
iff for all i ∈ N : π |= (∃ˆi γi)→ γi
iff π |=
∧
i∈N
(
(∃ˆi γi)→ γi
)
This concludes the proof. ✷
Our running example illustrates this result.
Example 1 (continued) Consider again the game of Example 1. Parti-
tion [123|4] satisfies each player’s goal and, consequently, is Nash stable. We
also have that [123|4] |= γ1 ∧ γ2 ∧ γ3 ∧ γ4 and, thus,
[123|4] |=
∧
i∈N
(
(∃ˆi γi)→ γi
)
.
Now recall that for partition π = [1|23|4] player 2’s goal is not satisfied and that
she cannot deviate and join another coalition to make this happen. In this case,
π|−2 = {{1}, {3}, {4}}. Moreover, π[2→ {1}] = [12|3|4], π[2 → {3}] = [1|23|4],
and π[2→ {4}] = [1|3|24]. Since, [12|3|4] 6|= γ2, [1|23|4] 6|= γ2, and [1|3|24] 6|= γ2,
it follows that π 6|= ∃ˆ2 γ2. Hence, π |= (∃ˆ2 γ2) → γ2. Player 1, however, could
deviate from π2 and join {2, 3} and thus have his goal satisfied. Thus, π is not
Nash stable. Now observe that {2, 3} ∈ π|−1 and that π[1 → {2, 3}] = [123|4].
Moreover, [123|4] |= γ1. As thus π |= ∃ˆ1 γ1, also π 6|= (∃ˆ1 γ1) → γ1. We may
conclude that
[1|23|4] 6|=
∧
i∈N
(
(∃ˆi γi)→ γi
)
.
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Nash stable partitions are not guaranteed to exist in Boolean hedonic games.
The two-player game ({1, 2}, 12,¬21) witnesses this fact, as can easily be ap-
preciated. The translation into a SAT instance gives us a way to compute all
Nash stable partitions of a given Boolean hedonic game. Recall, however, that
the size of ∃ˆi γi is generally exponential in the size of γi.
Core and strict core stability Core and strict core stability relate to group
deviations much in the same way as Nash stability relates to individual de-
viations. Group deviations we characterised in Section 5. We thus find that
Lemma 2 yields a straightforward characterisation in our logic of a specific
group blocking or weakly blocking a given partition.
Proposition 7 Let (N, γ1, . . . , γn) be a Boolean hedonic game and T a group
of players, and π be a partition. Let, furthermore, ~ı a fixed enumeration of VT
and ~b the corresponding T -separating Boolean vector. Then,
(i) T blocks π if and only if π |=
∧
i∈T
(
¬γi ∧ (γi)~ı←~b
)
,
(ii) T weakly blocks π if and only if
π |=
∧
j∈T
(
γj → (γj)~ı←~b
)
∧
∨
i∈T
(
¬γi ∧ (γi)~ı←~b
)
.
Proof: We give the proof for (i), as the one for (ii) runs along analogous lines.
Consider the following equivalences, of which the third one follows immediately
from Lemma 2.
T blocks π iff for all i ∈ T : π[T → ∅] Pi π
iff for all i ∈ T : π[T → ∅] |= γi and π 6|= γi
iff for all i ∈ T : π |= (γi)~ı←~b and π 6|= γi
iff π |=
∧
i∈T
(
¬γi ∧ (γi)~ı←~b
)
.
This concludes the proof. ✷
Observe that the size of
∧
i∈T
(
¬γi ∧ (γi)~ı←~b
)
is obviously polynomial in∑
i∈T |γi| and, hence, a partition π being blocking by particular group T of
players can be polynomially characterised. It might also be worth observing
that this characterisation is reminiscent of that for individual rationality and,
surprisingly, much more so than of the one for Nash stability.
As a corollary of Proposition 7 and de Morgan laws, we obtain the following
characterisations of a partition being core stable and of a partition being strict
core stable. The characterisations, however, involve a conjunctions over all
groups of players and as such is not polynomial.
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Corollary 1 Let (N, γ1, . . . , γn) be a Boolean hedonic game and π be a parti-
tion. Let for each coalition T , ~ı be an enumeration of VT and ~b the correspond-
ing T -separating Boolean vector. Then,
(i) π is core stable if and only if π |=
∧
T⊆N
∨
i∈T
(
(γi)~ı←~b → γi
)
,
(ii) Then, π is strict core stable if and only if
π |=
∧
T⊆N
( ∨
j∈T
(γj ∧ ¬(γj)~ı←~b) ∨
∧
i∈T
((γi)~ı←~b → γi)
)
.
Although core stable coalition structure are not guaranteed to exist in general
hedonic games, the restriction to dichotomous preferences allows us to derive
this positive result.
Proposition 8 For every Boolean hedonic game, a core stable coalition struc-
ture is guaranteed to exist.
Proof: We initialise N ′ to N and partition π to {∅}. We find a maximal subset
of S ⊂ N ′ for which all players are in an approved coalition that satisfies their
formulas. We modify π to π ∪{S} and N ′ to N ′ \S. The procedure is repeated
until no such maximal subset S exists. If N ′ 6= ∅, then π is set to π ∪ {{i} : i ∈
N ′}.
We now argue that π is core stable. We note that each player who was in
some subset S will never be part of a blocking coalition. If N ′ was non-empty in
the last iteration, then no subset of players in N ′ can form a deviating coalition
among themselves. ✷
By contrast, a strict core stable partition is not guaranteed to exist. To see
this consider the three-player Boolean hedonic game ({1, 2, 3}, 12, 21∨ 23, 32).
It is not hard to see that each of the five possible partitions is weakly blocked
by either {1, 2} or {2, 3}.
Envy-freeness Recall that a partition is envy-free if no player would strictly
prefer to exchange places with another player. Observe that for the trivial
partitions π0 = [1 | · · · |n] and π1 = [1, . . . , n], we have π0[i ⇆ j] = π0 and
π1[i ⇆ j] = π1 for all players i and j. Accordingly π0 and π1 are envy-free.
Envy-free partitions are thus guaranteed to exist in our setting. The following
lemma allows us to derive a polynomial characterisation of envy-freeness.
Lemma 3 Let (N, γ1, . . . , γn) be a Boolean hedonic game and i and j players
in N , and ϕ a formula in LN . Fix, furthermore, an enumeration k1, . . . , kn−2
of N \ {i, j} and let i~k = ik1, . . . , ikn−2 and j~k = jk1, . . . , jkn−2 enumerate
Vi \ {ij} and Vj \ {ji}, respectively. Then,
π |= ϕ
i~k,j~k←j~k,i~k if and only if π[i⇆ j] |= ϕ.
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Proof: With i~k and j~k being fixed we write ϕ′ for ϕ
i~k,j~k←j~k,i~k . The proof is
then by induction on ϕ.
For the basis, let ϕ = lm. There are three possibilities:
(a) lm = ij, (b) lm ∈ (Vi ∪ Vj) \ {ij}, and (c) lm /∈ Vi ∪ Vj .
If (a), we have that lm′ = ij′ = ij = lm. Now, either π(i) = π(j) or π(i) 6= π(j).
If the former, π[i ⇆ j] = π as well as both π |= ij′ and π[i ⇆ j] |= ij. If the
latter, however, it can easily be seen that both π 6|= ij′ and π[i⇆ j] 6|= ij.
For case (b), we may assume without loss of generality that lm = ik for some
k 6= j. Then, ik′ = jk. In case π(i) = π(j), obviously, π = π[i ⇆ j] as well as
k ∈ π(i) if and only if k ∈ π(j). Hence, π |= ik′ if and only if π[i⇆ j] |= ik. So,
assume π(i) 6= π(j). Now, either (i) k ∈ π(i) and k /∈ π(j), (ii) k /∈ π(k) and
k ∈ π(j), or (iii) k /∈ π(i) and k /∈ π(j). If (i), π |= ik′ as well as π[i⇆ j] |= jk.
In cases (ii) and (iii), we have π 6|= ik′ and π[i⇆ j] 6|= jk.
Finally, if (c), we have lm′ = lm. As l,m /∈ {i, j}, it can then easily be seen
that π |= lm′ if and only if π[i⇆ j] |= lm.
The cases ϕ = ¬ψ and ϕ = ψ → χ follow by induction. ✷
We are now in a position to state the following result.
Proposition 9 Let (N, γ1, . . . , γn) be a Boolean hedonic game. Furthermore,
for every two players, i and j, and enumeration k1, . . . , kn−2 of N \ {i, j}, let
i~k = ik1, . . . , ikn−2 and j~k = jk1, . . . , jkn−2 enumerate Vi \ {ij} and Vj \ {ij},
respectively. Then,
π is envy-free if and only if π |=
∧
i,j∈N
(
(γi)i~k,j~k←j~k,i~k → γi
)
.
Proof: By virtue of Lemma 3, the following equivalences hold:
π is envy-free
iff for all i, j ∈ N : π Ri π[i⇆ j]
iff for all i, j ∈ N : π[i⇆ j] |= γi implies π |= γi
iff for all i, j ∈ N : π |= (γi)i~k,j~k←j~k,i~k implies π |= γi
iff for all i, j ∈ N : π |= (γi)i~k,j~k←j~k,i~k → γi
iff π |=
∧
i,j∈N
(
(γi)i~k,j~k←j~k,i~k → γi
)
This concludes the proof. ✷
Observe that the size of
∧
i,j∈N
(
(γi)i~k,j~k←j~k,i~k → γi
)
is clearly polynomial in∑
i∈T |γi|. Hence, a partition π being envy-free can be polynomially charac-
terised.
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Example 1 (continued) Recall that γ3 = (31 ∨ 32) ∧ ¬34 and that player 3
envies player 4 if partition π′ = [1|24|3] obtains. To see how this is reflected by
Proposition 9, let 31, 32 and 41, 42 enumerate V3 \ {34} and V4 \ {43}, respec-
tively. Then,
((31 ∨ 32) ∧ ¬34)31,32,41,42←41,42,31,32 = (41 ∨ 42) ∧ ¬34.
Now, both π′ |= (41 ∨ 42) ∧ ¬34 and π′ 6|= (31 ∨ 32) ∧ ¬34, and, hence, π′ 6|=
(γ3)34,31,32←43,41,42 → γ3.
7 Related Work and Conclusions
Our motivation and approach is strongly reminiscent of the setting of Boolean
games in the context of non-cooperative game theory (Harrenstein et al., 2001).
A major difference with Boolean games and propositional hedonic games is that
in Boolean games, players have preferences over outcomes, where an outcome
is a truth assignment to outcome variables, and each outcome variable is con-
trolled by a specific player. This control assignment function, which is a central
notion in Boolean games, has no counterpart here, where the outcome is a
partition of the players. However, there are technical similarities with and con-
ceptual connections to Boolean games, especially when characterising solution
concepts. For instance, the characterisation of Nash stable partitions by propo-
sitional formulas (Section 4) is similar to the characterisation of Nash equilibria
by propositional formulas in Boolean games as by Bonzon et al. (2009). The ba-
sic Boolean games model of Harrenstein et al. (2001) was adapted to the setting
of cooperative games by Dunne et al. (2008). However, the logic used to spe-
cific player’s goals in the work of Dunne et al. was not intended for specifying
desirable coalition structures, as we have done in the present paper.
Our work also shares some common ground with the work of Bonzon et al.
(2012), who study the formation of efficient coalitions in Boolean games, that is,
coalitions whose joint abilities allow their members to jointly achieve their goals.
Our work also bears some resemblance to the work of Elkind and Wooldridge
(2009), who were interested in using logic as a foundation upon which to build
a compact representation scheme for hedonic games; more precisely, their work
made use of weighted Boolean formulas, and was inspired by themarginal contri-
bution nets representation for cooperative games in characteristic function form
proposed byIeong and Shoham (2005). The focus of Elkind and Wooldridge
(2009), however, was more on complexity issues than in finding exact char-
acterisations for solution concepts.
Finally, our work contributes to the extensive literature on compact rep-
resentations for cooperative games, which has expanded rapidly over the past
decade (Chalkiadakis et al., 2011).
Our characterisations of solution concepts enable to compute, using an off-
the-shelf SAT solver, a partition or all partitions satisfying a solution concept
or a logical combination of solution concepts. Of course, this translation is
interesting only when we cannot do better. For instance, for solution concepts
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leading to a polynomial characterisation, we cannot do better if and only if
the corresponding decision problem is NP-complete. Identifying the complexity
of finding partitions satisfying solution concepts for Boolean hedonic games is
therefore the most immediate direction of further research.
There are at least three more directions in which our work might be fur-
ther developed. First, we could think of relaxing our restriction to dichotomous
preferences and study more general hedonic games with compact logical rep-
resentations and derive exact characterisations of solution concepts. There are
several ways in which more general preferences can be incorporated in our log-
ical framework for hedonic games. For instance, instead of a single goal, we
could associate with each player a prioritised set of goals. The different possi-
bilities in this respect, however, vary in their level of sophistication. For some
of the cruder extensions our results extend naturally and straightforwardly. For
the more sophisticated settings more research seems to be required, which falls
beyond the scope of this paper.
Second, our restriction to hedonic preferences can also be relaxed, so that
players may have preferences that do depend not only on on the coalition to
which they belong. This would also pave the way to a more general logic of
coalition structures. Solution concepts, once generalised, can hopefully be char-
acterised. (We have positive preliminary results that go into this direction).
A third topic of future research would be the characterisation of classes
of hedonic and coalition formation games in our logic. As mentioned above,
various classes of hedonic games that allow for a concise representation have
been proposed in the literature. It would be interesting to see whether these
classes can also be polynomially characterised in our logic.
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